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FALUN GONG: AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S NATIONAL
SECURITY CONCERNS
Kelly A. Thomas
Abstract: The Chinese government's brutal crackdown on the Falun Gong
spiritual movement stands in marked contrast to its recent acknowledgement of its need
to improve its human rights record and repeated avowals to take the legal steps necessary
to conform with international human rights treaties. China's leadership has attempted to
justify the crackdown, citing both historical reasons and national security concerns.
Analysis of China's history demonstrates that repression of anti-government groups has
only hardened their resistance. Similarly, the campaign against Falun Gong has failed to
stop protests staged by the group's followers. In fact, Falun Gong's expressions of
dissent have become increasingly defiant. The Chinese government's policy of
repression undermines true national security. Lifting the ban will help the Chinese
government achieve its stated goals of protecting both China's national security and the
human rights of its citizens.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since July 1999, the Chinese government has waged an unrelenting
battle against Falun Gong,' a quasi-religious movement that blends Buddhist
and Taoist beliefs with the practice of qigong.2 The Chinese government has
banned the group,3 accusing group leaders of conspiring with overseas "pro-
democratic" and "anti-China" forces4  to overthrow the Chinese
1 The group is also known as "Falun Dafa." See Falun Dafa, A Brief Introduction, at
http://www.falundafa.org/eng/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2001).
2 Seth Faison, Subversion Trials Due for Leaders of Sect in China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1999, at
Al. Qigong is a traditional Chinese teaching that incorporates a broad range of healing techniques, martial
arts, and meditation. See generally Li HONGZHI, FALUN GONG (1999), at http://www.falundafa.org/eng/
index en.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2001).
T James Miles, China Media Attacks Falun Gong, BBC NEWS: ASIA-PACIFIC, July 23, 1999,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_401000/401678.stm.
4 Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi moved to New York City in 1997, reportedly under pressure from
Chinese authorities to restrict his activities. Seth Faison, Cult's Followers Rally in Beijing, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1999, at AI, col. 3. China issued a warrant for Li's arrest in July 1999 and offered a reward of
more than fifty thousand renminbi (about U.S. $10,000) for information leading to his arrest. See Wanted
Order Issued by the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China, PEOPLE'S DAILY, July
30, 1999, at 1, translated in 32 CHINESE L. & GOV'T 33 (1999); Beijing Posts Reward for Arrest of Li
Hongzhi, WORLD J., Aug. 4, 1999, at 1, translated in 32 CHINESE L. & GOv'T 37 (1999). Interpol rejected
China's request for help in apprehending Li, saying the request was politically motivated. Peter Carlson,
For Whom the Gong Tolls: Who's Behind the Biggest Threat to Chinese Rulers Since Tiananmen? An
Elusive Mystery Man Who Teaches Calisthenic-Like Exercises to Old Ladies in Tennis Shoes, and Appears
to be in Hiding Somewhere in the American Southwest. Unless He's in Queens., WASH. POST., Feb. 27,
2000, 2000 WL 2287861. The United States also turned down China's request for Li's arrest and
extradition, and invited the Chinese instead "to stop what the outside world perceived as an obvious
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government.5 The government-sponsored attack on Falun Gong has been
marked by arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, custodial deaths, show
trials resulting in lengthy prison sentences, 6 and government-imposed
psychiatric commitments. In spite of its severity, the crackdown has failed
to stop the near-daily protests staged by Falun Gong followers demanding
official recognition as a religion.
8
In the midst of this violent campaign against Falun Gong,9 China
signed a United Nations ("U.N.") agreement on technical cooperation
designed to help the Chinese government comply with international human
rights treaties to which China is a signatory.1° However, this pledge was
coupled with the caveat that China would develop only those rights that
suited its historic situation." Significantly, this caveat provides some
explanation for the apparent contradiction between the Chinese
government's pledge to cooperate with the U.N. in protecting human rights
and the ongoing assault against Falun Gong followers. For nearly 2,000
years, Chinese rulers have suppressed "superstitious sects, secret societies,
and evil religious organizations' ' 2 in an effort to prevent them from serving
instance of religious persecution." Massimo Introvigne, Center for Studies on New Religions: Falun Gong
101, at http://www.cesnur.org/testi/falunglO .htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2000).
5 Paper Calls for Educating Falun Gong Followers, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 9, 2001, LEXIS,
All Sources, Country Reports, China Country Files. According to a commentary in the People's Daily,
Falun Gong founder Li Honghzi's "anti-government face has been exposed, especially when he went
abroad to collaborate with overseas pro-democracy elements, pro-Taiwan-independence elements, and anti-
China forces in the West." Id. Xinhua is China's official government news agency; however, in practice it
is under the dual leadership of both the Communist Party and the government. YUEZHI ZHAO, MEDIA,
MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: BETWEEN THE PARTY LINE AND THE BOTTOM LINE 22 (1998). It is a
department under the China's cabinet (the State Council), but relies on instructions from the Party
bureaucracy, including the central Propaganda Department, for its daily operations. Id. The People's Daily
is the Chinese Communist Party's official newspaper. Id. at 18.
6 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
7 Amnesty Int'l, Torture-A Growing Scourge in China-Time for Action, available at
http://www.amnesty.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2001). See infra Part II.C. See Robin Munro, Judicial
Psychiatry in China and Its Political Abuses, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2000), for a detailed study on
govemment-imposed psychiatric commitments.
8 World: In Brief WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2001, LEXIS, News File. In China, religious organizations
may not be established without approval from the Religious Affairs Department of the People's
Government. See Registration Procedures for Venues for Religious Activities (May 1, 1994), translated in
http://www.qis.netlchinalaw/prclaw I ll.htm (last modified May 1, 1998).
9 According to Amnesty International, 1999 has seen "the most serious and wide-ranging
crackdown on peaceful dissent in China" since the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy movement
Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International Report 2000: China Including Hong Kong and Macao (2000),
available at http://www.amnesty.org.S'0 Robert J. ,Siaget, U.N Signs Human Rights Agreement with China, but Cites Violations, AGENCE-
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 20, 2000, LEXIS, News File.
11 Id.
12 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China]
(adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, July 1, 1979, amended by the Fifth
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as organizational focal points for widespread dissatisfaction with
government policies.' 3  Such secret religious societies have frequently
played a significant role in popular anti-government rebellions, particularly
during times of economic turmoil. However, China's long history of
suppression of such groups failed to eradicate them. To the contrary, as the
crackdown against Falun Gong demonstrates, suppression only hardened
their resistance. 
14
China's crackdown against Falun Gong has not only failed to
eradicate the group or stop its public protests, but threatens to produce the
very instability and chaos that the government intended to prevent. This
Comment examines the Chinese government's campaign against Falun
Gong and why it has been ineffective. Part II provides background on Falun
Gong, and describes the events precipitating the crackdown and the manner
in which it has been executed. Part III provides an historical overview of
Chinese secret societies and the government's attempts to suppress them.
Part IV explains why China's history provides no justification for the ban
and subsequent crackdown against Falun Gong. Part V analyzes to what
extent China's laws governing the ban are implicated under the international
human rights treaties to which China is a signatory. Finally, part VI
concludes that China's leadership should lift its ban against Falun Gong not
only to defuse the increasing tensions between the group's followers and the
government, but also to reduce the potential for the movement to become an
organizational focal point of widespread discontent.
Session of the Eighth National People's Congress, Mar. 14, 1997) art. 300 (P.R.C.), translated in
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/ prclaw60.htm [hereinafter CL].
" China's transition from command economy to market economy has resulted in a growing gap
between rich and poor due to widespread unemployment with little unemployment insurance and the
disappearance of the social welfare network formerly provided by the govemment. JOHN KING FAIRBANK
& MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 434-37 (1998). In 1997, typical top earners were managers
in private and foreign-joint ventures, while families of the unemployed, retired, and transient were at the
bottom. Id. at 436. But women and the elderly have suffered the most under China's economic reforms.
Id. Rampant consumerism among the newly rich has fueled a deep sense of dissatisfaction and alienation
among those unable to keep up. 1d. See also Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Fifty Years Into the
Transition, in CHINA BRIEFING 2000: THE CONTINUING TRANSFORMATION 49-50 (Tyrene White ed., 2000).
While most social groups gained economic ground in the 1980s, the privatization of China's state-owned
enterprises resulted in massive unemployment during the 1990s. Id. at 50. According to the author, "If any
stage of China's economic transition is likely to provoke mass discontent, this is it." Id.
4 Norman MacKenzie, Introduction to SECRET SOCIETIES 11, 19 (Norman MacKenzie ed., 1967)
("When we look at a secret group under pressure, we see that its members may choose to die rather than to
break the bonds that have united them."). See infra Part Il.
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II. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BATTLE AGAINST FALUN GONG
A. Background on the Falun Gong Movement
Li Honghzi founded the Falun Gong movement in 1992.15 Falun
Gong is essentially a spiritual movement based loosely on Buddhism,
Taoism, and Chinese qigong.16 Li teaches that human energy can be
channeled to achieve supernatural powers by performing certain meditative,
slow-motion exercises. 17  The movement's guiding principles are
"truthfulness, benevolence and forbearance," and practitioners are
encouraged to "give up various bad habits and attachments like anger,
anxiety, jealousy and the desire for personal fame and gain" as a means of
improving "family harmony, co-operation at work and safety in
neighborhoods."' 8  The movement has millions of followers in China,'
9
composed mostly of retired government officials, middle-aged women, and
students, who gather "regularly in public parks to practice their mystical
exercises. The Falun Gong movement appears to be organized primarily
through its three official websites. 21 The movement recommends a nine-day
introduction course and frequent contacts with local practice groups, but
anyone can start practicing Falun Gong by following the instructions from
one of the many books, cassettes, and websites available in a variety of
languages.22
In spite of Falun Gong's apparently benign nature, the Chinese
government has condemned the group as a cult that "plots to create
15 Faison, supra note 2.
16 id.
17 See Li HONGZHI, supra note 2.
iS Id.
'9 As a result of the crackdown, the number of Falun Gong followers is impossible to estimate.
Craig S. Smith, Banned Chinese Sect is Spurred On By Exiled Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2001, at A4.
The Chinese government uses a figure of two million-down from the twenty million estimated prior to the
crackdown, while Falun Gong's founder, Li Hongzhi, claims 100 million, most of them in China. Id.
20 Erik Eckholm, A Quiet Roar: China 's Leadership Feels Threatened by a Sect Seeking Peace, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at A 10. Followers commonly meet at public parks, libraries, hospitals, or community
centers to exercise, study and discuss Falun Gong's teachings. Falun Dafa, Learning Falun Dafa, at
http://www.falundafa.org/eng/start.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2001).
21 Falun Gong's main website is Clearwisdom.net, which posts messages from the group's founder
Li Hongzhi. FalunDafa.org is an introductory site for people interested in practicing the Falun Gong
meditation and exercise techniques. This site describes the basic exercises, provides information on
practice sites, and offers books and tapes. Falunlnfo.org is a website that provides news and information
on the Chinese government's ongoing efforts to eradicate the group.
22 See Falun Dafa, supra note 20.
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ideological chaos among the people in an attempt to topple the leadership of
the CPC [Communist Party of China] and the Chinese government.
23
B. Events Precipitating the Crackdown
Although it is unclear when the Chinese government initially became
aware of the Falun Gong movement, the first major confrontation between
Falun Gong followers and the government occurred on April 25, 1999, when
ten thousand of the movement's followers appeared without warning outside
Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing.24 Falun Gong
followers were protesting a recent academic journal article, warning of the
dangers posed by cults in China.25 During the demonstration, protestors
"stayed motionless, calm and seated on the sidewalk while organizers
communicated by mobile telephones. 2 6 To find out what was going on,
Zhu Rongji, China's Prime Minister, sent a message to the gate of
Zhongnanhai.27 In response, five followers of the Falun Gong met with Zhu,
at least three of whom "were reportedly very high-ranking, albeit retired,
[government] officials, including one retired major general who had worked
in the military intelligence section of the People's Liberation Army's
General Staff Department., 28  After presenting their case, the protestors
quietly returned to their homes.29  Although the Chinese leadership must
have been alarmed by the failure of its intelligence service to prevent the
demonstration, 30 it made no arrests and characterized the sit-in as-merely
"wrongful conduct."'
23 Paper Calls for Educating Falun Gong Followers, supra note 5.
24 Joseph Fewsmith, Historical Echoes and Chinese Politics: Can China Leave the Twentieth
Century Behind?, in CHINA BRIEFING 2000: THE CONTINUING TRANSFORMATION 11, 42 (Tyrene White
ed., 2000). Under Chinese law, all assemblies, processions and demonstrations must be preauthorized from
the appropriate government officials. See Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of Assembly,
Procession and Demonstration of the People's Republic of China (June 1992) (P.R.C.), translated in
http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclawI13.htm (last modified May 1, 1998).
25 Urgent Life and Times ofLi Hongzhi, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 22, 1999, LEXIS, All Sources,
Country Reports, China Country Files. On April 19, 1999, Professor He Zuoxiu, of the Chinese Academy
of Sciences, published an article criticizing Falun Gong in a Tianjin Normal University magazine, and on
April 23, 1999, more than 6300 Falun Gong practitioners staged a silent sit-in at the university in protest.
Id. For the original article, see He Zuoxiu, IDo Not Approve of Teenagers Practicing Qigong, TEENAGER
Sci. & TECH. OUTLOOK, Apr. 19, 1999, translated in 32 CHINESE L. & Gov'T 95 (1999).
26 Faison, supra note 4.
27 Fewsmith, supra note 24, at 42.
28 id.
29 Falun Dafa, Answers to Commonly Asked Questions, at http://www.falundafa.org/eng/faq.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2000).
3o Introvigne, supra note 4.
31 One Falling Leaf Heralds Autumn, INSIDE CHINA MAINLAND, July 1, 1999, LEXIS, All Sources,
Country Reports, China Country Files.
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C. The Crackdown
In spite of its initial restraint, the Chinese leadership clearly viewed
Falun Gong as a serious threat and ultimately responded with a
comprehensive strategy aimed at crushing the group. The primary attack
against Falun Gong has been through the legal system. The government
passed various pieces of legislation in order to formally justify suppression
of the group's followers. The government has also launched a massive
propaganda campaign aimed at winning public approval for the ongoing
crusade. Finally, the government has waged a technological assault against
the group's communications network.
1. The Legal Attack Against Falun Gong
In its assault against Falun Gong, the Chinese leadership has used the
legal system as its primary instrument of repression. The transformation of
what is perceived to be a major political struggle into a legally justified
assault is demonstrated by the involvement of the government's major law-
making institutions.32 Although laws and regulations arguably criminalizing
groups like Falun Gong existed prior to the government's crackdown, 33 the
battle lines were clearly drawn with the promulgation of various pieces of
special legislation specifically targeting Falun Gong.34 While the 1997
Criminal Law code provided the framework for the government's attack on
Falun Gong, China's major law-making institutions-the State Council, the
Supreme People's Court ("SPC"), and the National People's Congress
("NPC")-provided the substance by way of administrative notices and
32 Control of the legislative process is an essential aspect of the Communist Party's role as leader of
state and society; however, there are few accounts detailing how its policies are transformed into
legislation. Perry Keller, Legislation in the People's Republic of China, 23 U.B.C. L. REv. 653, 660
(1989).
33 These include administrative regulations for registering mass organizations, holding
demonstrations, and delineating administrative penalties for disturbing public order, as well as the Criminal
Law code provisions punishing "serious" regulatory violations in addition to prohibiting the organization of
"superstitious sects, secret societies, or heretical organizations." See Laws Exist for the Banning of Falun
Gong, LEGAL SYS. DAtLY, July 25, 1999, translated in 32 CHINESE L. & GOV'T 43 (1999).
3 The Criminal Law is as much a political text as a legal one; its drafters were concerned with
providing a legal basis for state action, with little thought directed to due process. Donald C. Clarke &
James V. Feinerman, Antagonistic Contradiction: Criminal Law and Human Rights in China, 141 CHINA
Q. 138 (1995). Therefore, it primarily lists various crimes and their punishments without providing much
in the way of specific definition. Id. at 137. Crimes are defined by means of special legislation that either
specifically criminalizes a certain act or prohibits an act and provides vaguely that "where it constitutes a
crime, criminal responsibility will be affixed," without providing any guidance as to under what
circumstances the performance of a prohibited act would constitute a crime. Id. at 138.
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regulations, judicial interpretations, and legislative decisions, all of which
have the force of law.
35
The first signs of an impending crackdown came shortly after the
April 24, 1999 demonstration outside Zhongnanhai, when two State Council
ministries declared Falun Gong illegal and banned all of the group's
activities. On April 28, the official press, Xinhua News Agency,36 observed,
"[t]he threatening of social stability in the name of practice of a discipline
should be dealt with according to law."37 On July 22, 1999, following three
days of protests involving 30,000 followers of Falun Gong, in dozens of
cities across China, China's Ministry of Civil Affairs announced a ban on
Falun Gong in People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), the Communist Party's
official newspaper. 38  The Ministry of Civil Affairs accused the group of
engaging in "illegal activities" including propagating "superstition," inciting
and creating "disturbances," and disrupting "public security. 39  China's
Ministry of Public Security simultaneously issued a ban on all Falun Gong
activities.40 The ban prohibited assembly for meetings, the posting of signs,
images, or logos, and the circulation of books, audio, and visual material, as
well as "other propaganda. ' 41 Followers were prohibited from gathering and
demonstrating (including sitting demonstrations), spreading rumors that
would disturb social order, and organizing activities in resistance of the
42government. Any violation of these rules would lead to either criminal
charges or administrative punishment, depending on the severity of the
violation.43 Criminal sanctions are imposed formally by the courts, while
administrative sanctions are imposed directly by the police.
44
35 See CL, supra note 12; Keller, supra note 32, at 662 (NPC legislative decisions), 667 (SPC
judicial interpretations), 669-70 (administrative notices and regulations).
36 See ZHAO, supra note 5.
37 One Falling Leaf Heralds Autumn, supra note 31. "Those familiar with CCP [Chinese
Communist Party] locution are of course aware that such statements portend a crackdown." Id. The much-
used phrase "punished according to law" means "punished according to proper legal procedure" but given a
"formal punishment under the Criminal Law, not an administrative sanction." Clarke & Feinerman, supra
note 34, at 136.
" ZHAO, supra note 5, at 18.
3, Decision of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China Concerning the
Banning of the Research Society of Falun Dafa [hereinafter MCA Ban], in Two Documents Concerning the
Banning of the Research Society of Falun Dafa, PEOPLE'S DAILY, July 22, 1999, translated in 32 CHINESE
L. & Gov'T31 (1999).
40 Notice of the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China, in Two Documents
Concerning the Banning of the Research Society of Falun Dafa, supra note 39.
41 MCA Ban, supra note 39.
42 id.
43 Id.
4 Donald C. Clarke, Note, Concepts of Law in the Chinese Anti-Crime Campaign, 98 HARV. L. REv.
1890, 1899 (1985).
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The ministerial ban merely formalized a crackdown that had already
begun. By July 23, 1999, at least ninety-seven Falun Gong leaders and
thousands of practitioners, many of them elderly women gathering for
morning exercises, were detained in cities across northeast China, Shanghai,
and Guangzou.45 They were taken to public stadiums for "education"
sessions where some were beaten with electric batons before being
released.46
In spite of mass arrests and detentions over the ensuing months, the
ministerial ban failed to halt Falun Gong protests, so the Supreme People's
Court began preparing for criminal trials, 47 issuing detailed explanations
("SPC Explanations") of the relevant criminal laws to be used in prosecuting
Falun Gong leaders.48 Shortly thereafter, China's top legislative body
formally declared war against Falun Gong. On October 30, 1999, the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued a lengthy
interpretation ("NPC Decision") 49 of existing provisions contained in Article
300 of the 1997 Criminal Law banning "heretical cult organizations."50 The
maximum penalty under Article 300 is life imprisonment." The NPC
Decision emphasized that group leaders should be treated more harshly than
ordinary practitioners.52  By making an example of the "leaders," the
Chinese government tried to create a climate of fear and intimidation,
thereby decreasing popular support for the group. The NPC Decision
called on the courts, prosecutors, police, and administrative bodies to
45 Amnesty Int'l, Falungong Movement Detentions: Alienating and Potentially Destabilizing,
available at http://www.amnesty.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2001).
46 id.
" Criminal sanctions are generally more severe than administrative sanctions. Clarke, supra note
44. Policy dictates what type of anti-social behavior is serious enough to warrant sanctions under the often
elastic provisions of the Criminal Law. Id.
48 Explanations of the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate Concerning
Laws Applicable to Handling Cases of Organizing and Employing Heretical Cult Organizations to Commit
Crimes (adopted at the 1079th Meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court, Oct. 9,
1999, and at the 47th Meeting of the Ninth Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Oct. 8, 1999) (P.R.C.), References/Laws & Regulations, at http://www.chinaonline.com [hereinafter
Explanations].
49 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Banning Heretical Cult
Organizations, and Preventing and Punishing Cult Activities (adopted at the 12th Session of the Standing
Committee of the Ninth People's Congress, Oct. 30, 1999) (P.R.C.), References/Laws & Regulations, at
http://www.chinaonline.com [hereinafter NPC Decision].
50 See CL, supra note 12.
51 id.
52 See NPC Decision, supra note 49.
53 Sophia Woodman & Yu Ping, "Killing the Chicken to Frighten the Monkeys ": The Use of State
Security in the Control of Freedom of Expression in China, in SECRECY , ND LIBERTY: NATIONAL
SECURITY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 223, 225-26 (Sandra Coliver et al. eds.,
1999).
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prevent and punish cult activities "in accordance with law.,5 4 According to
the NPC Decision, "heretical cults, operating under the guise of religion,
qigong or other forms" that "disturbed social order" or "jeopardized
economic development" were banned "according to law" and should be
punished "resolutely.
The government's assault against Falun Gong intensified after the
promulgation of the NPC Decision.5 6  By late October, more than 3,000
people were detained in Beijing, most of them in the public setting of
Tiananmen Square. 57 Official sources reported that by November 4, 1999,
over a hundred Falun Gong followers had been charged with crimes, but
dozens more were subsequently charged.58 Hundreds of other Falun Gong
practitioners were reportedly sent to "re-education through labor" camps
without charge or trial.59
2. The Chinese Government's Propaganda Campaign Against Falun
Gong
The Chinese government has launched a massive propaganda
campaign against Falun Gong in an effort to win public approval for its
ongoing crusade against the group. 61 Since the ban in July 1999, the official
Chinese media has issued a constant barrage of criticism against Falun
Gong. 62  State-run television and radio frequently repeat the government
63prohibition against participating in Falun Gong protests. Indeed, the
propaganda campaign has occasionally dominated the entire news hour
64
54 NPC Decision, supra note 49.
55 Id.
56 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 9.
57 Eckholm, supra note 20.
58 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 9.
59 Id. Chinese law provides for criminal and administrative punishments. See Clarke, supra note 44,
at 1899-900. "Reform through labor" is a criminal punishment administered by the courts and carries a
minimum sentence of six months. Clarke & Feinerman, supra note 34, at 142. "Re-education through
labor" ("RETL") is an administrative punishment administered by the police. Id. at 141-42. Persons can
spend up to four years in RETL and, under certain circumstances, an RETL sentence can result in internal
exile for life. Id. at 142-43. RETL sentences are subject to almost no oversight or review. Id.
60 ZHAO, supra note 5, at 26. The Chinese government uses media propaganda to transmit social and
political values in an attempt to persuade people about the correctness of a policy in the hope of affecting
their thinking, emotions, and behavior. Id.
61 Miles, supra note 3. See also Phil Cunningham, Falungong Crackdown-Invisible Arrests of
Invisible Protestors in Tiananmen Square, PAC. NEWS SERV.: PAC. PULSE, Nov. 3, 1999, at http://www.
pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/5.22/991103-square.html.
62 Miles, supra note 3.
63 Id.
64 Cunningham, supra note 61.
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with viewers frequently subjected to pictures of mutilated corpses (allegedly
Falun Gong-inspired suicides), tearful denunciations, and dramatic accounts
of mental disturbances blamed on the group.65 The People 's Daily has given
saturation coverage to its justification of the ban against Falun Gong,
describing the campaign as "a serious struggle that would have a bearing on
the future of the Communist Party and the state. 66
In an effort to deter further Falun Gong protests, as well as to punish
individuals, "key members" were given show trials where they were
67convicted and sentenced to as much as eighteen years in prison. The first
publicly reported trial took place in Hainan Province in November 1999.68
Four of the group's "key members" were convicted by the Intermediate
People's Court in Haikou for organizing "illegal" gatherings of Falun Gong
cult members and going to other cities to "spread the Falun Gong cult
,69 70doctrine," receiving prison sentences ranging from two to thirteen years.
In December 1999, four more "principal organizers" were convicted by
Beijing's No. 1 Intermediate People's Court with sentences ranging from
sixteen to eighteen years-among the harshest given to political or religious
dissenters in over a decade.71 The defendants were all Communist Party
members and influential in government and business, underscoring Falun




66 Miles, supra note 3.
67 In criminal cases, guilt or innocence is determined prior to trial. Clarke & Feinerman, supra note
34. If there were any doubt about the guilt of the suspect, the trial would not take place, as trials are mainly
propaganda efforts, intended to deter others from engaging in the proscribed activity. Id. According to
Amnesty International, the convictions of alleged Falun Gong leaders were a foregone conclusion as the
law was used retroactively to secure convictions and defense lawyers were prevented from pleading not
guilty. Amnesty Int'l, China's Clamp Down on "Heretical Organizations" (Mar. 22, 2000), at
http://www.amnesty.org.
68 Imprisonment for Four Falun Gong Cult Members, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 12, 1999,
LEXIS, All Sources, Country Reports, China Country Files. The four Falun Gong members convicted
were Song Yuesheng, Chen Yuan, .liang Shilong, and Liang Yulin. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Sect Four Get Jail Terms of Up to 18 Years, HONG KONG STANDARD, Dec. 27, 1999, LEXIS, All
Sources, Country Reports, China Country Files. The four Falun Gong members convicted were Li Chang,
Wang Zhiwen, Ji Liewu, and Yao Jie. Id.
72 id.
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3. Attack on Falun Gong's Communications Network
Chinese authorities have also attempted to dismantle Falun Gong's
organization by shutting down its communications network.73 Early in the
crackdown, Chinese authorities managed to block access to Falun Gong's
website,74 and the Ministry of Public Security issued a public notice
prohibiting dissemination of information regarding the group.75 In August
1999, shortly after the group was banned, the Canadian press reported that
two government-funded academic institutions in China were behind the
hacking of two Canadian Internet service providers because they were
hosting Falun Gong websites.76 However, the Chinese government has not
been able to completely block access to Falun Gong websites, and Falun
Gong activists abroad continue to reach people inside China via an ever-
expanding network of Internet sites that are able to circumvent the Chinese
government's efforts.77
D. The Chinese Government's Failure to Quiet Falun Gong
In spite of the government's relentless efforts to crush Falun Gong
and periodic claims of victory over the movement, the crackdown has failed.
In July 2000, the official press reported that "Falun Gong has come to the
end of its tether and is putting up a deathbed struggle., 78 The next month
the government claimed that ninety-eight percent of Falun Gong followers
had been converted to "normal" life after "persuasion and education" and
that it had been necessary to prosecute only a "tiny fraction" of Falun Gong
practitioners. 79  However, in spite of the government's proclamations of
victory, Falun Gong protests continue unabated. Nearly 1,000 protestors
73 Hans Lombardo, China Sect Crackdown Hits Web, INTERNET.COM, ASIA INTERNETNEWS, July 26,
1999, at http://asia.intemet.com/1999/7/2605-sect.html.
74 Id. See also China Fetes Falun Gong Day with Slow Bandwidth, CHINAONLINE, May 15, 2000, at
http://www.chinaonline.com.
71 China Prohibits Pro-Falun Gong Activities, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 22, 1999, LEXIS, All
Sources, Country Reports, China Country Files.
76 China Engages in Cyberwar, Say Canadian ISPs, INTERNET.COM, ASIA RUMBLINGS, Aug. 2,
1999, at http://asia.intemet.com/Rumblings/0801.html. The hackers penetrated the systems and flooded the
servers with incomplete data requests. Id.
77 Further, the overseas Falun Gong group tried to send daily Chinese-language broadcasts into
China, but they were jammed shortly after they started. Craig S. Smith, Persistent Protestors From Banned
Sect Keep Beijing Police on Edge, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2000, at A3.
78 Xinhua Hails Decisive Victories in Anti-Falun Gong Drive, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, July 21,
2000, 2000 WL 24852321.
79 China Convicts 151 Falun Gong-Related Criminals, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, Aug. 23, 2000,
2000 WL 25637011.
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gathered in Tiananmen Square on October 1, 2000, China's National Day,8 °
and in the two weeks prior to National Day, over 600 Falun Gong followers
attempting to enter Beijing were detained by police in nearby provinces.81
Many of the protestors who reached the square, mostly women, were kicked,
punched, and pushed into buses by police. 82 The scene was repeated a few
days later when officers pummeled and shoved protestors into police vans.
83
In the first week of 2001, hundreds of Falun Gong followers staged scattered
protests in Tiananmen Square, their brief attempts to unfurl banners quickly
overwhelmed by the huge plainclothes police force.84
Falun Gong's peaceful protests against government repression have
resulted in harsh repercussions for many of the group's followers. As of
early 2001, some 150 Falun Gong followers have reportedly received prison
sentences up to eighteen years, more than 600 have been forcibly committed
to mental hospitals, 10,000 have been sent for re-education through labor
without trial,85 and another 50,000 held in temporary detention centers.8 6
Once detained, protestors risk torture and even death.87 Human rights
monitors report widespread beatings and torture of detained Falun Gong
followers, resulting in nearly a hundred confirmed deaths.88  Authorities
go Massive Falun Gong Protest in China: Hundreds of Followers Beaten, Detained in Tiananmen
Square, MSNBC NEWS/INT'L NEWS, Oct. 1, 2000, at http://www.msnbc.com/msn/470636.asp.
8 Id. Thirty-eight followers were detained after police ordered passengers on one train to curse
Falun Gong or show proof they were not members. Id.
82 One Thousand Falun Gong Members Rounded Up in Beijing Protest, LOOKSMART.COM, Oct. 1,
2000, at http://www.looksmart.com. One woman carrying a small child was hit by police, while a
plainclothes policeman was seen beating another protestor with a broom, and several children were
arrested. Id.
83 Martin Fackler, Falun Gong Protest in Beijing Square, AFP, Oct. 26, 2000, available at
http://www.cesnur.org/testi/falun_072.htm. One man was kicked in the stomach and head until blood ran
from his mouth after being thrown to the ground by police, while an elderly woman was dragged by her
hair for several yards as bystanders pleaded with police to stop. Id.
84 Smith, supra note 19.
:5 See supra note 59, for a brief description of re-education through labor.
86 Falun Dafa InfoCenter, Crackdown Facts and Figures (Feb. 14, 2001), at http://www.faluninfo.
net/persecution frame.asp. According to Robin Munro, a senior research fellow at the Law Department
and Center of Chinese Studies at the University of London, "These various reports [from overseas Falun
Gong support groups) have not yet been independently confirmed by international human rights groups or
similar organizations, and instances of factual error or misreporting may eventually come to light; however,
there is presently no reason or evidence for doubting their overall veracity." Munro, supra note 7, at 108.
87 Torture and mistreatment of detainees are reportedly due, in part, to the government's hostile
attitude towards political prisoners, the pressure to extract confessions, the absence of a presumption of
innocence in Chinese law, the lack of effective judicial supervision over the police, and the lack of proper
procedures for redress of complaints of torture. Clarke & Feinerman, supra note 34.
88 See Letter from Liu Qing, Chairman, and Xiao Qiang, Executive Director, Human Rights In
China, to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations (Jan. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.hrichina.org/pr/english/0 1180 1.htm. See also Erik Eckholm, The World: Losing by Winning; A
Crackdown Burns Itself N.Y TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, LEXIS, News File. The Hong Kong-based Information
Center for Human Rights & Democracy reported that a forty-six-year-old man died in a labor camp after
VOL. 10 No. 2
MARCH 2001 FALUN GONG & CHINESE NATL SECURITY
have acknowledged several custodial deaths, claiming, however, that most
of them resulted from suicide or illness. 89 Despite the harsh treatment Falun
Gong followers receive, it is estimated that millions of faithful followers
remain in China and several thousand reside abroad.90
In reaction to this treatment, Falun Gong's message has become more
overtly politicized and even radical. In September 2000, Falun Gong's
official website began attacking China's president Jiang Zemin as the man
personally responsible for Falun Gong's persecution.9' In January 2001, the
group's founder Li Honghzi warned that followers facing persecution need
not adhere to the movement's principle of forbearance.92 Indeed, later that
month five people believed to be members of the Falun Gong doused
themselves with gasoline and set themselves on fire in the middle of
Tiananmen Square.93  Moreover, in a stepped-up effort to rally support,
Falun Gong followers began covertly posting the group's leaflets in subway
stations and slipping them under apartment doors, as well as placing fliers
on the dormitory doors and bicycles of students at Beijing University, the
traditional wellhead of political activism in China.95
The crackdown on Falun Gong seems disproportionate given that the
group professes no political aims and seeks only the freedom to practice its
meditation exercises. Moreover, it violates China's constitutional provisions
nominally guaranteeing freedom of religion and expression in the form of
speech, assembly, association, and demonstration,96 all of which are
suffering for two months with severe diarrhea and other illnesses. Amnesty International has reported
many accounts of torture, including the use of electric shock batons and a device known as the "Di Lao," in
which victims' wrists and feet are shackled and linked together with crossed steel chains making it nearly
impossible to walk or sit down. Amnesty Int'l Media Advisory: China, New Report on Torture and Ill-
Treatment of Falun Gong Followers (Oct. 22, 1999), at http://www.amnesty.org. Jeremy Page, Falun
Gong Demonstrates in Tiananmen Square, REUTERS, Oct. 27, 2000, available at http://www.cesnur.
org/testi/falun_072.htm. He was denied medical treatment until a week before he died. Id. One woman
died after being forced into a mental hospital where she was regularly denied food and given unspecified
injections. Id.
89 Page, supra note 88.
90 Introvigne, supra note 4. The exact number is in dispute. Id.
91 Li Hongzhi, Why Do We Shine the Light Directly on Jiang Zemin? (Sept. 9, 2000), at http://www.
clearwisdom.net (calling Jiang Zemin "the highest representative of the evil force in the human world").
92 Li Hongzhi, Beyond the Limits of Forbearance (Jan. 2, 2001), at http://www.clearwisdom.net.
The three principles of Falun Gong are truthfulness, benevolence, and forbearance. See Falun Dafa, supra
note 20.
93 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Five Linked to Banned Sect in China Set Themselves on Fire in Protests,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at Al. One woman died while the other four were taken into police custody.
Id.
94 Id.
95 Smith, supra note 19.
96 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA]
(adopted May 5, 1982, amended 1999) art. 35 (P.R.C.), translated in http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/
prccon.htm.
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considered fundamental rights in many countries. 97  Perhaps more
significant is the fact that despite the brutal suppression of the Falun Gong
movement, the Chinese government has failed to stop the near-daily and
increasingly defiant protests staged by the group's followers.
III. THE HISTORY OF SECRET SOCIETIES IN CHINA: A FRAMEWORK FOR
UNDERSTANDING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO FALUN
GONG
A. Background
The Chinese government's prohibition against secret societies is
rooted in China's 2,000-year history of popular rebellions against corrupt
imperial dynasties, which were either instigated or significantly fueled by
98secret societies. Traditional Chinese secret societies were generally
informal, popular organizations founded to provide its members with mutual
aid and protection,99 whether religious, social, physical, or economic. 00 The
oppositional nature of the secret societies, together with the quasi-religious
indoctrination of their members, often resulted in the belief that the laws of
the secret society superseded the ordinary laws of the landl 01-an
unacceptable proposition for the ruling government. 10 2  Therefore, the
government severely punished individuals for any activity connected with
secret societies, including membership.'
1 03
In spite of government suppression, secret societies proved to be quite
successful in mobilizing forces of secular discontent around religious
beliefs, especially in times of social and economic stress. 10 4 Indeed, the first
known secret society rebellion that ultimately toppled the Qin Dynasty in
206 B.C began as a tax revolt.'05 Similarly, in A.D. 9, the Red Eyebrows, a
secret society named after its battle makeup, sparked a rebellion against
97 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., amend. I.
98 See generally FEI-LING DAVIS, PRIMITIVE REVOLUTIONARIES OF CHINA: A STUDY OF SECRET
SOCIETIES IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 154, 178-80 (1971).
99 DAVID OWNBY, BROTHERHOODS AND SECRET SOCIETIES IN EARLY AND MID-QING CHINA: THE
FORMATION OF A TRADITION 2 (1996).
1oo See generally JEAN CHESNEAUX, SECRET SOCIETIES IN CHINA 55-79 (1971).
101 See DAVIS, supra note 98, at 3 ("The officials draw their power from the law; the people from the
secret societies." (Chinese saying)).
102 Leon Comber, Foreword to JEAN CHESNEAUX, SECRET SOCIETIES IN CHINA vi (1971).
103 CHESNEAUX, supra note 100, at 75.
104 Jacques deLisle, Who's Afraid of Falun Gong?, CHINAONLINE, Apr. 19, 2000, at http://www.
chinaonline.com.
105 DAVIS, supra note 98, at 178. The Qin Dynasty lasted from 255 B.C. to 206 B.C. BARBARA E.
WARD, SECRET SOCIETIES 215 (Norman MacKenzie ed., 1967).
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Wang Mang, who had provoked considerable popular antagonism by
introducing radical reforms in taxation, usury, commerce, and the ownership
of land. 1
06
B. Organizations Fighting for Religious Freedom
Many secret societies were primarily religious organizations driven
underground as a direct result of government persecution. In A.D. 843, the
Tang government banned alien religions, including Buddhism, in an attempt
to gain control over their growing influence and to raise revenues. 10 7  The
government felt threatened by the Buddhist Church because of its growing
power and its accumulation of wealth from its refusing to pay taxes.
10 8
Despite several officially inspired persecutions, Buddhist culture blossomed
during this period. 10 9 Underground Buddhist organizations developed, and
from this time forward, secret religious sects became particularly prevalent
in China.10 One of these underground Buddhist sects, the White Lotus, was
severely persecuted during the Tang period, a significant factor in its later
emergence as a political movement."' The White Lotus endured for over a
thousand years' 12 and sparked rebellions that eventually succeeded in
overthrowing both the Yuan"
3 and the Ming Dynasties.114
:06 WARD, supra note 105, at 214.
107 WOLFRAM EBERHARD, A HISTORY OF CHINA 192 (1977). Over 4000 Buddhist temples and
40,000 shrines and monasteries were secularized and became taxable. Id. At the same time, millions of
acres of land belonging to the temples also became taxable. Id.
108 See FAIRBANK & GOLDMARK, supra note 13, at 79.
:09 WARD, supra note 105, at 218. The Tang Dynasty lasted from A.D. 618 to A.D. 907. Id.
10 Id.
... Id. at 219.
112 Id. The White Lotus was founded in A.D. 376 and was active at least up until the 1796 rebellion.
See FAIRBANK & GOLDMARK, supra note 13, at 190.
13 WARD, supra note 105, at 219-20. The Mongol Empire (the Yuan Dynasty) in China was the
culmination of a millennium of the mounted archer's military prowess all across Eurasia. FAIRBANK &
GOLDMARK, supra note 13, at 119. The Mongol Empire lasted from A.D. 1279 until A.D. 1368. Id. After
Ghengis Khan and his Mongol hordes erupted in all directions in 1206, his sons and grandsons ruled four
khanates in Persia, South Russia, Central Asia, and China. Id. Because of their illiteracy, the Mongols
could not administer the government or police local communities. Id. at 121-23.
14 WARD, supra note 105, at 219-20. The White Lotus rebellion against the Mongols began in A.D.
1344. Id. The White Lotus and other rebel groups combined under the leadership of a former Buddhist
monk, Chu Yuan-Chang, who became emperor following the defeat of the Mongols in A.D. 1368. Id. at
220. The White Lotus gave the new empire its name, Ming, after two messianic figures, Big and Little
Ming Wang, who were thought to have been sent by Buddha Maitreya to restore peace and order to the
world. Id. The White Lotus later took part in uprisings against the Ming Dynasty after it had become weak
and corrupt, and foreign armies were threatening China's borders. Id. Severely weakened as a result of
these uprisings, the Ming Dynasty fell to the Manchus in the early 1600s. Id.
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C. Political Uprisings
China's history of conflict between the government and the secret
societies reached its climax during the Qing Dynasty 15 under the Manchus.
Aggravated by the Manchus' extremely cruel methods of suppression, the
number of secret societies and secret society rebellions increased
dramatically during this period. 16  Under Qing law, "all persons who
without being related or connected by intermarriage, establish a brotherhood
or association among themselves, by the ceremonial of tasting blood, and
burning incense shall be guilty of an intent to commit the crime of
rebellion."' 17  The law prohibited gatherings of more than twenty able-
bodied males and forty elderly males." 8 Qing law required that the leaders
of secret societies be subject to death by strangulation, while requiring that
accessories be subject to lesser punishments." 9  The law required the
dismissa.1 and prosecution of government officials who failed to suppress
known secret societies. 120  Qing law singled out for particularly harsh
treatment secret societies whose members were known to "commit robberies
and other acts of violence."' 121 This harsh treatment included the beheading
of leaders and the strangulation of regular members. 22  The law also
prohibited processions, beating gongs and drums, and chanting sutras and
spells in public in order to maintain peace and order.' 23  According to
conservative estimates, on average, the government under the Qing Dynasty
either executed or exiled more than ten secret society members each month
over the twelve-year period between 1788 and 1800.124 The government
carried out the majority of these executions on the spot, in the marketplaces
of the areas in which the society members lived.
125
In spite of severe penalties against secret societies, rebellions led by
secret societies during the period from 1788-1800 intensified as popular
antagonism toward the government spread.' 26 Indeed, three of the largest
"1 See CHESNEAUX, supra note 100, at 75. The Qing Dynasty last from A.D. 1644 to A.D. 1911. Id.
116 WARD, supra note 105, at 220.
117 CHESNEAUX, supra note 100, at 75. Secret society members were often bound together by blood
oaths. OWNBY, supra note 99, at 3.
118 DAVIS, supra note 98, at 12-13. The government did not restrict the number of females. Id.
"' CHESNEAUX, supra note 100, at 75.
"0o Id. at 76.
121 id.
122 Id.
123 DAVIS, supra note 98, at 13.
124 OWNBY, supra note 99, at 126.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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and most damaging secret society rebellions in Chinese history occurred
during the Qing period: the White Lotus Rebellion, the Taiping Rebellion,
and the Boxer Rebellion.
The White Lotus rebellion against the Qing in 1796 began as a protest
against excessive taxation. 127  The group had been mobilizing adherents
from among the poor peasants in the countryside for some time by
promising the advent of the Buddha Maitreya who would restore the former
Ming Dynasty and put an end to disaster, disease, and personal suffering.
128
As a result, the society spread widely over China and developed its own
internal organization and leaders. 129 The rebellion lasted nearly eight years
and was finally suppressed only by a very large military operation, at a cost
to the government of nearly 200 million ounces of silver (five years of
revenue). 130
Even more devastating than the White Lotus Rebellion was the
Taiping Rebellion of 1850. The Taiping Rebellion was an anti-Manchu,
quasi-Christian messianic, social protest movement aimed at freeing the
peasants from oppressive landowners. 131 Although the Taipings were not
part of a secret society, their rebellion was significantly aided by secret
societies, most notably the Triads.132 Before being crushed by the Manchu
government, this ten-year uprising resulted in the capture of nearly half of
China 133 and cost millions of lives.
134
Perhaps the most infamous secret society revolt was the Boxer
Rebellion of 1900.135 The Boxers followed the qigong tradition and
practiced extremely fast-moving and violent martial arts, including spirit
boxing, from which the group took its name,' 36 literally "the Fists of
Righteous Harmony."' 137  The Boxers relied on supernatural forces for
invulnerability in battle.' 38  Originally an anti-Manchu movement, it was
'27 FAIRBANK & GOLDMARK, supra note 13, at 190.
128 Id. at 189-90.
129 EBERHARD, supra note 107, at 296.
130 FAIRBANK & GOLDMARK, supra note 13, at 190.
131 The Taiping leader, Hung Hsiu-Ch'Uan, was proclaimed emperor under the name of T'ien-wang
(Heavenly King) and declared himself Jesus Christ's younger brother. CHESNEAUX, supra note 100, at 90.
The sacred books of the new dynasty drew extensively on the Bible. Id.
132 WARD, supra note 105, at 226. See also C. A. Curwen, Taiping Relations with Secret Societies
and Other Rebels, in POPULAR MOVEMENTS AND SECRET SOCIETIES IN CHINA: 1840-1950 65 (Jean
Chesneaux ed., 1972).
133 WARD, supra note 105, at 226.
34 EBERHARD, supra note 107, at 285.
135 Comber, supra note 102, at vii.
136 Prasenjit Duara, After 100 Years, Myths of Boxer Rebellion Live On, CHINAONLINE, June 21,
2000, at http://www.chinaonline.com.
137 WARD, supra note 105, at 227.
138 Duara, supra note 136.
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transformed by the Qing Empress into a movement against Western powers
and Japan.' 39  The movement was eventually stopped only with the
intervention of British, Russian, American, and French forces. 140
D. The Role of Secret Societies in the Communist Party's Rise to Power
Secret societies also played a significant role in the Communist
Party's rise to power during the Chinese Revolution. The Chinese
Revolution began with the successful overthrow in 1911 of the Qing
Dynasty by Sun Yat-sen's Republican Party. 141  Not only were the
Republicans aided by secret societies, 142 but Sun Yat-sen was himself a
member of two secret societies, the Elder Brothers and the Triads.143 By
1927, Sun Yat-sen's Republican government had collapsed, 144 and Chiang
Kai-shek's Nationalist Party had gained control of the cities with the help of
two Shanghai secret societies, the Green Band and the Red Band.
145
Meanwhile, the Communists had moved into the countryside in an effort to
enlist the peasantry in revolution. 146 The Communists were well aware of
the strong influence secret societies exercised over the peasantry and thus
attempted to recruit at least two secret societies, the Red Spears 147 and the
Elder Brothers. 48  Indeed, the Communist leader Mao Zedong 149 himself
made direct appeals to the Elder Brothers to join the resistance against the
Japanese invasions in North China. 1
50
139 Comber, supra note 102, at vii.
14o WARD, supra note 105, at 210.
141 Id. at 228.
142 Id.
143 Sun Yat-sen was a member of the Triads. WARD, supra note 105, at 233. He was also a member
of the Chi Kung Tang, an overseas Chinese secret society first formed in the United States. Comber, supra
note 102, at viii. When Sun Yat-sen was elected president of the new republic, he celebrated in a solemn
quasi-religious service to salute the spirits of the great Ming emperors who had expelled the Mongols.
CHESNEAUX, supra note 100, at 159. His contemporaries interpreted this ceremony as an homage to the
secret societies' 250 years of struggle against the foreign Qing Dynasty. Id.
14 See generally EBERHARD, supra note 107, at 315-18.
141 CHESNEAUX, supra note 100, at 164. These societies were primarily criminal organizations
involved in slave running, opium trafficking, kidnapping, blackmailing, gambling, gun-running, protecting
rackets and even murder. Id.
146 Id. at 177-79.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 182.
149 Mao Zedong assumed leadership of the Communist Party in 1935. FAIRBANK & GOLDMARK,
supra note 13, at 307.
150 CHESNEAUX, supra note 100, at 182. Some of the secret societies were openly pro-Japanese,
including the Way of Fundamental Unity and some of the Triads. Id. at 185.
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In summary, a combination of religious and political disaffection
appeared repeatedly throughout Chinese history,151 and from its earliest
days, China's Communist Party recognized that groups invoking mystical
forces have historically played a significant role in toppling weak authorities
during transitional periods in China. Thus, while the Communist party
attempted to utilize the revolutionary potential of secret societies during its
climb to power, it also issued a ban against secret societies even before the
People's Republic was officially established. 5 2 While it is unclear to what
extent the secret societies may have actually aided the Communists in
defeating the Nationalists, the Communists' ambivalence toward the secret
societies was quite clear.
IV. Is FALUN GONG A REVOLUTIONARY SECRET SOCIETY?
Certainly, Falun Gong does bear some resemblance to traditional
Chinese secret societies that have contributed to China's history of popular
rebellions. This includes its organization around various religious and
supernatural beliefs; 53 its appeal to those who have not fared well during
China's transition from a command economy to a market-based society;
154
its ability to mobilize so many of its followers into individual, as well as
coordinated action; and its ability to withstand persecution. Moreover, the
unusually harsh crackdown on Falun Gong reveals the government's belief
that the group has the revolutionary potential of other secret societies. 155
However, this analysis ignores compelling evidence that Falun Gong
is nothing more than what it claims to be-an inherently peaceful group
merely seeking the right to practice its meditation exercises free from
government harassment. Falun Gong existed in China for seven years
before the group gained attention for its peaceful sit-in at Zhongnanhai in
April 1999. Moreover, the group has remained peaceful, even if resistant, in
spite of the government's violent assault against its followers. In addition,
China's long history of secret society rebellions sheds little light on Falun
Gong's capacity for inspiring widespread rebellion. While past Chinese
'5' WARD, supra note 105, at 216.
52 Lev Deliusin, The I-Kuan Tao Society, in POPULAR MOVEMENTS AND SECRET SOCIETIES IN
CHINA: 1840-1950, supra note 132, at 22.
153 DeLisle, supra note 104.
54 Id. See also FAIRBANK & GOLDMARK, supra note 13, at 434-36.
155 Regarding the law's treatment of secret societies, the NPC Decision interpreting Article 300 of the
Criminal Law makes explicit that "[h]eretical cult organizations shall be resolutely banned according to the
law, and all of their criminal activities shall be dealt with severely." NPC Decision, supra note 49. See
also CL, supra note 12.
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secret societies have participated in popular anti-government rebellions,
history reveals that the secret societies were primarily reactionary groups
whose activities were in response to chaotic societal conditions, whether
economic, political, or both.
In short, Falun Gong appears to be an inherently peaceful group;
however, the government's continued repression of Falun Gong only
increases the risk of transforming it from a harmless group into a
revolutionary force. Just as China's history demonstrates that government
hostility toward secret societies served only to increase their resistance to
government authority, the current crackdown on Falun Gong has
demonstrably radicalized the group's followers, which may only fuel the fire
of resistance.
V. THE LAWS IMPLEMENTING CHINA'S BAN AGAINST FALUN GONG ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND
ENDANGER CHINA'S INTERNAL STABILITY
The sources of law governing China's ban against Falun Gong
conflict with international human rights standards. These include the
standards promulgated under the following: (1) the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("UDHR"); 1 56 (2) the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR"); 157 (3) the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation
and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("Siracusa Principles"); 158 and (4) the Johannesburg
Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information ("Johannesburg Principles").
159
A. International Human Rights Law and the National Security Exception
Bans against anti-government groups for national security reasons are
not unique to China, and the international community has developed a
framework for balancing a state's national security interests with the human
156 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, arts. 18, 19, available at http://www.un.
org/rights/ [hereinafter UDHR].
' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 18, 19, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPRI.
'58 The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 29-32, reprinted in SECRECY AND LIBERTY: NAT'L SECURITY, FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION, supra note 53, at 18-19 [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
159 The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information, reprinted in SECRECY AND LIBERTY: NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
ACCESS TO INFORMATION, supra note 53, at I -10 [hereinafter Johannesburg Principles].
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rights of its people. Nearly every government throughout history has viewed
anti-government dissent as a threat to national security, a threat that
increases when dissident ideas are held by an organized group., 60 The non-
intervention rule represented the traditional notion of national sovereignty
that each government was free to treat its citizens in whatever way it chose
without interference from other nations. 61 As international law developed,
however, human rights became the one exception to the non-intervention
rule. 162 Under modem international law, a government has an. obligation to
protect the human rights of its citizens. 163 Even so, modem international law
also recognizes that certain expression-related rights may be permissibly
restricted where "national security" is at stake. 164 "National security" is
generally understood to refer to a government's ability to defend itself from
violent overthrow by domestic subversion or external aggression. 165
Governments often ban groups considered to be a threat to national
security.166 However, there is a growing recognition among the international
community that repression of basic human rights increases the risk of
rebellion. 67 For this reason, an international framework for balancing the
interests of the state against those of its citizens has gradually evolved, and
the UDHR and the ICCPR are primary components of that framework.
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The laws governing China's ban against Falun Gong conflict with the
international human rights standards to which China has pledged
compliance. As a member of the United Nations, China has pledged to
promote "universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms" as enumerated in the UDHR. 168 The UDHR asserts
without qualification that everyone has the right to freedom of religion,
160 Exaggerated Fears for the National Security: Some Experience to Date, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1134,
1135 (1972).






:64 ICCPR, supra note 157, art. 19(3) ("national security," "public order").
65 Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, Introduction, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1972).
:66 Exaggerated Fears for the National Security: Some Experience to Date, supra note 160, at 1135.
167 Johannesburg Principles, supra note 159, at 1. "Convinced that it is essential, if people are not to
be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human
rights should be protected by the rule of law." Id.
168 UDHR, supra note 156, pmbl.
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expression, association, and assembly. 69 These protections are codified and
elaborated upon in Articles 18 and 19 of the ICCPR. 70  China became a
signatory to the ICCPR in 1997, although it has not yet ratified the treaty. 71
In November 2000, China's Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya and U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson signed a
memorandum of understanding on technical cooperation. 72 A central goal
of this agreement is to assist China in bringing its laws in line with these
treaties.1 73  While human rights abuses perpetrated under the guise of
protecting national security will not necessarily end merely by a change in
the law, the Chinese leadership has acknowledged its need to improve its
human rights record, 74 and there is no doubt that China takes seriously the
proceedings in the U.N. Human Rights Commission 75 and responds
vigorously to attacks on its human rights practices. 76  In short, China will
need to modify its laws before it can ratify the ICCPR.
C. The Siracusa and the Johannesburg Principles
The international community has developed a framework to protect
the fundamental rights of individuals in expression-related activities. Some
169 Id. arts. 18-20.
170 ICCPR, supra note 157, arts. 18, 19.
171 The ICCPR was signed by China's ambassador to the U.N. on Oct. 27, 1997. LAWYERS
COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WRONGS AND RIGHTS: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S
REVISED CRIMINAL LAW 25, n.63 (1998). However, the government made it clear that it would not be
implemented until ratified through specific legislation. Id.
172 Siaget, supra note 10.
73 Erik Eckholm, China Signs U.N. Pact on Rights and Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at
A4.
174 Roy Gutman, China's Concession/Admits It Can Improve Human Rights After Talks, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 16, 1999, 1999 WL 8154429. Following a two-day exchange on human rights between U.S. and
Chinese officials, the Associated Press quoted the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi as
saying, "For historical reasons, there is still some room for us to improve with respect to human rights." Id.
'7 The Commission is essentially a monitoring body with three procedures available for responding
to violations of human rights. A.M.Weisburd, Implications of International Relations Theory for the Int'l
Law of Human Rights, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 49-50 (1999). These procedures are the
following: (1) examining communications from sources outside the U.N. alleging gross violations of
human rights by U.N. members; (2) appointing a working group or special rapporteur to investigate the
human rights situation in a particular state, which can lead to resolutions addressing the actions of the state
investigated and detailed reports describing the actions of the governments concerned; and (3) appointing a
special rapporteur to focus on particular categories of human rights violations rather than focusing on all
types of human rights violations within a particular state. Id.
176 For example, on April 18, 2000, at the fifty-sixth meeting of the U.N. Commission for Human
Rights, China blocked a U.S. resolution censuring its human rights record. Spokesman Thanks Countries
for Vetoing U.S. Motion on Human Rights, BBC, Apr. 20, 2000, LEXIS, News File. This defeat was
China's ninth escape from censure since its assault on unarmed pro-democracy protesters near Tiananmen
Square in 1989. Id.
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of the worst human rights violations over the past fifty years have resulted
from government suppression of expression-related activities on national
security and related grounds.177  In response, two sets of international
guidelines have been developed that offer a framework for determining the
proper balance between a government's legitimate concerns for peace and
security and the fundamental rights of its citizens: the Siracusa Principles on
the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("Siracusa Principles"), 178 and the Johannesburg
Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information ("Johannesburg Principles"). 79  Both the Siracusa Principles
and the Johannesburg Principles reflect the trend in international law toward
shielding expression-related offenses from criminal sanctions except where
violence is threatened.180  The United Nations has endorsed both the
Siracusa Principles and the Johannesburg Principles as valuable guides to
interpreting standards concerning these fundamental freedoms under the
ICCPR.
18 1
1. The Siracusa Principles
The Siracusa Principles were drafted in 1985, in Siracusa, Sicily, by a
group of international law experts in an effort to achieve an effective
implementation of the ICCPR.182  The Siracusa Principles set forth the
general criteria for justifying human rights limitations as well as criteria
relating to specific areas. 183  Provisions 29 through 32 address national
security:
29. National security may be invoked to justify measures
limiting certain rights only when they are taken to protect
the existence of the nation in its territorial integrity or
political independence against force or threat of force;
177 Sandra Coliver, Commentary to SECRECY AND LIBERTY: NAT'L SECURITY, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION, supra note 53, at 11.
171 Siracusa Principles, supra note 158.
179 Johannesburg Principles, supra note 159.
0 Coliver, supra note 177, at 80.
's' Id. at 18 n.30, 80-81.
182 Kuk Cho, Tension Between the National Security Law and Constitutionalism in South Korea:
Security for What?, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J. 125, 164 (1997). The meeting was convened by the International
Commission of Jurists, the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, the Urban
Morgan Institute for Human Rights, and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences.
Id.
183 Id.
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30. National security cannot be invoked as a reason for
imposing limitations to prevent merely local or relatively
isolated threats to law and order;
31. National security cannot be used as a pretext for
imposing vague or arbitrary limitations and may only be
invoked when there exist adequate safeguards and
effective remedies against abuse; and
32. The systematic violation of human rights undermines true
national security and may jeopardize international peace
and security. A state responsible for such violation shall
not invoke national security as a justification for
measures aimed at suppressing opposition to such
violation or perpetrating repressive practices against its
population. 1
84
Under Principles 29 and 30, any restriction justified on national
security grounds must be in response to a threat to the country as a whole
and cannot be merely to the ruling party.
85
2. The Johannesburg Principles
The Johannesburg Principles were drafted in 1995 by international
law experts and human rights experts at a conference at Witwatersrand
University, in Johannesburg, South Africa, to provide more specific
principles that would adequately safeguard the right to freedom of
expression, as well as the prerogative of governments to restrict this freedom
when necessary to protect legitimate national security interests. 186 Under the
Johannesburg Principles, restrictions may not be overbroad or ambiguous
such that they provide the legal basis for the imposition of heavy penalties
on people who have expressed opinions but have not resorted to or
advocated violence. 187 Terms generally regarded as overbroad or ambiguous
include "hostile propaganda," "agitation," "subversion," "disinformation,"
and "false rumors."' 88  The Johannesburg Principles also requires that
sanctions cannot be arbitrary, meaning that they cannot be based on laws
that are vague, imprecise or formulated with a clear intent to provide a
18 Siracusa Principles, supra note 158.
:85 Coliver, supra note 177, at 19.
86 Id. at 13.
'87 Id. at 25.
188 Id.
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"legal" basis for silencing people. 189 An example of a vaguely stated ground
for limiting expression would be one that imposes a restriction against an
expression that "in any way damages or compromises the economic stability
of the nation. ' 19°  The Johannesburg Principles limit legitimate national
security interests to the prevention of violence aimed at changing a country's
government, institutions, or borders; the prevention of espionage; and the
protection of genuine military secrets, such as the movement of troops and
details of weapons design.' 91 Furthermore, governments must respect and
may not punish expression-however challenging to the regime in power-
that falls short of incitement to violence.
92
D. China's Laws Governing the Ban Against Falun Gong are
Inconsistent with International Human Rights Standards
China's laws governing the ban against Falun Gong do not conform to
either the Siracusa Principles or the Johannesburg Principles because they
provide criminal penalties for the peaceful exercise of expression-related
activities by imposing vague and arbitrary limitations. According to the
SPC Explanations issued prior to the NPC Decision banning Falun Gong,
Articles 300, 103, 105, and 113 of China's Criminal Law code are to be used
in combination against any individual deemed a member of a "heretical
cult.' 193 Article 300 is a general provision outlawing cults and prohibiting
the "crime of disrupting public order."' 194  Articles 103 and 105 define
"crimes of endangering national security," making it illegal for anyone to
"organize, plot, or act" to "split the country or undermine national
unification,"'' 95 or to "subvert the political power of the state and overthrow
the socialist system."' 196  Under Article 113, anyone committing a crime
"endangering national security" that is deemed "serious" or "particularly
189 Id.
190 Id.
'9' Id. at 21.
'92 Johannesburg Principles, supra note 159, princ. 7(b).
:93 Explanations, supra note 48.
94 CL, supra note 12, ch. VI, sec. 1. Article 300 was originally labeled a "cime endangering
national security" before the Criminal Law code was revised in 1997. See Human Rights in China, China:
Social Groups Seek Independence in a Regulatory Cage (Sept. 1997), available at http://www.hrichina.org/
reports/freedom.html. Measures to protect public order overlap with national security measures when civil
disorder escalates beyond a local temporary affair to become a threat to the country. Elizabeth Evatt, The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Freedom of Expression and State Security, in
SECRECY AND LIBERTY: NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION
supra note 53, at 83-84.
:95 CL, supra note 12, art. 103.
96 Id. art. 105.
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vile" may be sentenced to death. 19 7  According to the explanations,
"especially serious" violations of Article 300 include setting up
organizations or recruiting members across provinces and collaborating with
overseas agencies, organizations, or individuals. 198  Neither the Siracusa
Principles nor the Johannesburg Principles would prevent China from
promulgating laws providing criminal sanctions for violent acts; however,
the Chinese government has routinely used its laws to punish expression that
falls far short of incitement to violence. Indeed, as the crackdown on Falun
Gong demonstrates, China's systematic violation of human rights
undermines true national security.
Therefore, China should bring its laws into compliance with
international human rights standards. In doing so, China can make
significant progress toward achieving its stated goal of eventual ratification
of the ICCPR. This would also bring China closer to conforming with its
own constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion and expression in the
form of speech, assembly, association, and demonstration.
VI. CONCLUSION
China should lift its ban against Falun Gong and halt its campaign to
crush the group. This would defuse the increasing tensions between Falun
Gong followers and the government, thus reducing the potential for
widespread unrest. History has shown that repression of anti-government
groups increases rather than decreases the risk of large-scale rebellion.
Falun Gong's continuing protests in spite of the government crackdown
provides clear evidence of the futility of attempts to ban expression-related
activities. Just as imperial crackdowns provoked rebellion from the White
Lotus, Taiping, and other sects, the crackdown on Falun Gong increases the
potential for the movement to become an organizational focal point for the
widespread (but still-diffuse) resentment that many Chinese feel about
corruption, favoritism, taxes, fees, and a host of other issues of economics
and tinfaimess.1 99 Lifting the ban on Falun Gong eliminates the reason for
the group's continued protests against the government. Without any reason
to oppose the government, there is no reason for other dissident groups to
form alliances with Falun Gong.
'7 Id. art. 113.
:99 Explanations, supra note 48.
99 deLisle, supra note 104.
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